In this paper we investigate the properties of iterated multiple belief revision. We examine several typical assumptions for iterated revision operations with an ontology where an agent assigns ordinals to beliefs, representing strength or firmness of beliefs. A notion of minimal change is introduced to express the idea that if no evidence to show how a belief set should be reordered after it is revised, the changes on the ordering should be minimal. 
Introduction
Iterated belief revision has been intensively investigated in the community of belief revision [2] [5] [9] [10] [13] [17] . The major concern in the research is the reducibility of iterated revisions to single step revisions. Boutilier in [2] proposed an assumption to capture the relationship, named (CB) by Darwiche and Pearl in [4] :
Darwiche and Pearl in [4] argued that (CB) would be overcommitted and could be weakened and enhanced elsewhere with the following assumptions: It was shown by Freud and Lehmann (see [10] ), however, that these postulates do not go well with AGM framework: (C2) is inconsistent with AGM postulates. Nevertheless, Darwiche and Pearl argued in [5] that the original AGM postulates should be weakened in order to accommodate the additional postulates for iterated revision. More other iterated belief revision frameworks have been also proposed in the last few years, reflecting different philosophy of iterated belief revision [9] [10] [14] .
No matter how much divergency these frameworks have made it has been generally accepted that belief change should not be considered as a purely set-theoretical change of belief sets but an evolution of epistemic states, which encapsulate beliefs with the information of firmness of beliefs. The change of epistemic states involves not only the change on belief set but also the change on orderings over the belief set. Whenever a belief set is revised by new information, the ordering of the belief set should also change to accommodate the new information. The further revision will be based on the new ordering. Therefore the posterior revision operation is normally not identical with the prior operation. This idea has been explicitly expressed by Nayak et al. in [14] by using a subscription to differentiate two steps revision. For instance, (C1) and (C2) can be restated in the following form:
(C2 ) If B ¬A, then (K * A) * A B = K * B. 1 We remark that this change is significant since the postulates will no long lay restrictions on single step revisions but to specify the relationship between the first step revision and the second step revision. In fact, it has been shown in [14] that (C1 ) and (C2 ) are consistent with AGM postulates. Therefore we can use these additional postulates to extend the AGM framework without revising the AGM postulates. Moreover, Nayak et al. in [14] even showed that (C1 ) can be strengthened further by the following postulate without loss of consistency:
Most of the research in iterated revision based on single belief revision, that is, the new information is represented by a single sentence. It is even more interesting if we consider the problem in the setting of multiple belief revision. By using the notation introduced in [22] and Nayak et al.'s notation, all the above postulates can be restated in the following form:
Surprisingly, the extension does not increase the complexity of these postulates. Contrarily, they become more readable. For instance, (⊗C1) expresses the assumption that if the second revision confirms all the information contained in the first one, the first revision is superfluous [10] .
One question is to be answered that whether these postulates are consistent with the multiple version of AGM postulates, especially with the Limit Postulate introduced by Zhang et. al. in [19] . Another question, which is more important, that what are the underlying ontology to use these postulates. As Friedman and Halpern pointed out in [6] that there has been too much attention paid to postulates and not enough to the underlying ontology. We need to make it clear that in what situation an agent revises her epistemic states in the way that we specified by these postulates.
In this paper we exploit an ontology where an agent assigns an ordinal to each of her belief, representing the strength or firmness of the belief 2 . We introduce a notion of minimal change of belief degrees, which expresses the idea that if no evidence to show that how a belief set should be ordered after it is revised, the change of the ordering on the belief set should be minimal. We show that under the assumption of minimal change of ordering, (⊗C1) holds no matter in what degree the new information is believed. However, the postulates (⊗CN ) and (⊗CB) heavily depend on how the new information is accepted. We show that (⊗CN ) holds if and only if the new information is accepted and kept in the highest degree of firmness whereas (⊗CB) holds if and only if the new information is accepted in the lowest degree comparing with the old beliefs. These results provide an ontological base for the analysis of the rationality on the postulates for iterated belief revision.
Throughout this paper, we consider a propositional language L as the object language. We denote individual sentences in L by A, B, or C, and denote sets of sentences by F ,F 1 , F 2 etc. If F is an infinite set of sentences,F denotes a finite subset of F . If F is a finite set, ∧F means the conjunction of its elements. We shall assume that the underlying logic includes the classical firstorder logic with the standard interpretation. The notation means the classical first-order derivability and Cn the corresponding closure operator, i.e., 
Preliminaries in Multiple Belief Revision
Firstly, let's review the basic concepts in mutual belief revision. Zhang and Foo in [22] introduced a version of multiple belief revision, called set revision, which allows to revise a belief set by any set of sentence or another belief set. Nine postulates were proposed. Among them the first eight postulates are the direct generalization of the associated AGM ones(also see [12] [13]). The last one, called Limit Postulate, deals with the compactness of infinite belief revision [22] , which says that a revision by an infinite belief set can be approached by the revisions of the belief set with its finite subsets. Formally, let K be the set of all belief sets. A function ⊗ is called a set revision function if it satisfies the following postulates:
where K is a belief set. F , F 1 , F 2 are sets of sentences.
The model of set revision is based on the following variant of epistemic entrenchment.
Definition 1 [18] Let K be a belief set, P a partition of K, and < a total order over P. The triple K = (K, P, <) is called a total-ordered partition(TOP) of K. For any P ∈ P and A ∈ P , P is called the rank of A, denoted by r(A).
A NOP is called a nicely-ordered partition (NOP) if it satisfies the following Logical Constraint:
It is easy to see that a TOP is nothing but a total pre-order on belief set. The ordering < in an NOP is essentially the reverse order of epistemic entrenchment(EE). Logical Constraint here is the combination of (EE2) and (EE3) [7] . (EE5) does not satisfied by NOP. Therefore NOP is weaker version of EE (see more detail about the relationship between NOP and EE in [22] ).
With the notion of NOP, a set revision operator can be constructed as follows:
It has been shown in [22] 
that a set revision operator satisfies the nine postulates if and only if it is a NOPbased revision
3 .
Iterated Multiple Belief Revision
Now we consider iterated operations in the setting of multiple belief revision. Firstly, let's consider the relationship between the additional postulates.
Relationship of iterated revision postulates
The following lemma shows the relationship between the postulates for iterated revision and AGM postulates.
Lemma 1 Let ⊗ be a revision function that satisfies (⊗1)-(⊗6). Then i). (⊗C1) implies (⊗7 ) and (⊗8). ii). (⊗CB) implies (⊗C1) and (⊗C2). iii). (⊗CN ) implies (⊗C1), (⊗C3) and (⊗C4).
Due to the relationship we will concentrate on the postulate (⊗C1), (⊗CB) and (⊗CN ) only in the sequent of the paper. We will examine the conditions when the postulates hold. First, let's find an ontology where these conditions can be stated.
Perfectly-ordered partition
In [20] , Zhang et al. introduced a special kind of niceordered partition in which the partition is well-ordered. Definition 3 [20] A nicely-ordered partition Σ = (K, P, <) is called a perfectly-ordered partition (POP) if < is a well-order on P. An NOP-based revision function is a POP-based revision if it is generated by a perfectlyordered partition.
Mapping a sentence to a natural number or an ordinal is one of the traditional ways to rank beliefs. Applying logical constraint on the mapping to make it to be an epistemic entrenchment ordering has been also exploited in [17] [18] . However, the ordering we use here should be differentiated from the ways to map possible worlds to ordinals [16] or to map Spohn's system of spheres to ordinals [15] since the underlying ontologies are significantly different even though they might be interconvertible.
The following lemmas show the logical properties of a POP.
Lemma 2 Let Σ = (K, P, <) be a POP and η the ordinal type of
Conversely, let r be a function mapping a belief set K to an ordinal η. If, for any α < η, {A ∈ K : r(A) ≤ α} is logically closed, then r determines a POP over K.
Lemma 3 Let ⊗ be a revision function generated by a POP Σ = (K, P, <). For any set F of sentences, if F ∪K is inconsistent, then B ∈ K ⊗ F if and only if there exists a sentence
A ∈ K such that F ¬A and b(A ∨ B) < P min or A ∨ B where P min = min{r(A) : A ∈ K & F ¬A}.
Minimal change of belief degrees
The theory of belief revision is dominated by the principle of minimal change. Such minimal change should not mean the change in cardinality of belief sets but mean the change of epistemic states: belief sets and associated degrees of beliefs. Such a distinction is not essential in one shot revision but becomes crucial in iterated revisions. An iterated revision operation should be viewed as a function with three inputs (belief set, new information, ordering over the belief set) and two outputs (new belief set, new ordering). The change of the ordering during revision partially determines the relationship between one step revision and iterated revision. Therefore different philosophy of minimal change of ordering leads to different postulates for iterated revision[2] [13] . The following definition depicts an instantiation of the principle of minimal change that the ordering on beliefs should keep unchanged unless it violates the Logical Constraint.
Definition 4
Let ⊗ be a revision function based on a POP Σ = (K, P, <) and η be the order type of P. For any set F of sentences and an ordinal α, define a POP
1. For any β < max{η, α + 1},
where
: β < max{η, α + 1}}.
For any
if and only if β < γ
We call Σ F,α the minimal change of Σ with respect to F and α.
The intuition behind the definition is that if we accept the new information F with the degree of α, F and its logical consequence with K will be merged to the old partition in the way that the ordering of partition will keep unchange except the belief degree of some K ∪ F 's logical consequence could be higher because them are enhanced by new information.
The following theorem shows that under the assumption of minimal change of POP, (⊗C1) holds no matter in what degree the new information is accepted.
Theorem 1 Let ⊗ be a revision function based on a POP Σ = (K, P, <). Let ⊗ F 1 be the revision function based on a minimal change Σ
F1,α of Σ. Then we have
Corollary 1 (⊗1)-(⊗6) and (⊗LP ) are consistent with (⊗C1).

Two Radical Strategies of Accepting New Information
We have seen that, provided the change of belief degrees is minimal, (⊗C1) holds no matter where the new information is inserted. However, the strategy to accept new information significantly affects the result of iterated revision. In this section, we consider two radical strategies of accepting new information: extreme cases that new information is accepted in absolute affirmative and in extreme suspicion. The following theorem deals with the first case.
Theorem 2 Let ⊗ be a revision function based on POP Σ = (K, P, <) and ⊗ F 1 the revision function based on
Σ's minimal change Σ F1,α . If α = 0 and P 0 ⊆ Cn(F 1 ), then we have (⊗CN ) If F 1 ∪ F 2 is consistent, (K ⊗ F 1 ) ⊗ F1 F 2 = K ⊗ (F 1 ∪ F 2 ).
The theorem shows that (⊗CN ) holds if new information is always accepted in the top level of firmness(no weaker than any old beliefs)
. Surprisingly, the condition is not only sufficient but also necessary except for some limit cases. It is not hard to verify that (⊗CN ) holds for any α if one of the following conditions is true:
3. there is β such that P ≤β = Cn(F 1 ).
By excluding these limit cases we have
Therefore, only if the new information is accepted in the level higher than any other old information, (⊗CN ) is satisfied.
Next we consider another extreme strategy of inserting new information: the new information is accepted in the lowest degree.
Theorem 3 Let ⊗ be a revision function based on a POP Σ = (K, P, <) with ordinal type η. Let ⊗ F 1 be the revision function based on the minimal change
The necessary condition for (⊗CB) is presented in the following proposition.
Therefore to satisfy (⊗CB), new information should be accepted in the lowest degree unless it has been included in the belief set.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have presented a model-theoretical analysis of several typical postulates for iterated belief revision in the setting of multiple belief revision. The model we use in the paper is one of the typical ways to rank beliefs: assigning beliefs to ordinals. We have shown that Darwiche and Pearl's postulate (⊗C1) requires the change of orderings to be minimal. It doesn't put any restrictions on the way to rank new information. However, as the strengthening of (⊗C1), Boutilier's postulate (⊗CB) implies that new information should be accepted in the lowest degree of belief whereas Nayak et al.'s postulate (⊗CN ) requires that new information should be accepted in highest level of firmness. These results provide an ontological base for the analysis of rationality of postulates for iterated belief revision.
As a side-product, we have proved that all the postulates discussed in the paper are consistent with Zhang and Foo's postulates for multiple revision. Therefore the multiple revision framework can be strengthened by choosing some of the postulates. Since the AGM postulates and Darwiche and Pearl's postulate (⊗C1) have received strong ontological support and are most intuitive. A framework that consists of these postulates would be most applicable. Zhang et al. used the framework in the construction of mutual revision functions and negotiation functions [23] , which provides another ontology of iterated belief revision.
Proofs of Theorems Proof of Lemma 1: i). For (⊗7),
ii) and ii) are straightforward. .
Proof of Lemma 2:
For the first part of the lemma, assume A ∈ Cn(P ≤α ). Then there exist
For the second part of the lemma, let P = {P α : α < η}, where P α = {A ∈ K : r(A) = α}. It is easy to verify that P satisfy the logical constraint.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Suppose that F ∪ K is inconsistent. Then {r(A) : A ∈ K and F ¬A} is nonempty. Since P is well-ordered, there must be a minimum P min in the set. Now assume that B ∈ K ⊗ F . According to Definition 2, there exists A 0 ∈ K such that F ¬A 0 and
Conversely, assume that A ∈ K, F ¬A and
Proof of Theorem 1:
In the case that (
is consistent, the result is straightforward. Thus we assume that both (
where r and r 1 is the rank with respect to Σ and Σ F1,α , respectively. Then there exists A 0 ∈ K such that F 1 ∪ F 2 ¬A 0 and r(A 0 ) = β. Similarly, there exists
min⊗ , we know that r(A) = β and r 1 (A) = γ.
Next we prove β = γ. On one hand, since A ∈ K ∩ (K ⊗ F 1 ), by the construction of minimal change,
. Hence P ≤γ ∪F 1 A. It follows that there exists a finite subsetF 1 of
It follows that there exists a finite
For the other direction, assume that
The case of A 3 ∨ B is obvious. In the case of r(
By Lemma 3, we yield that
Proof of Theorem 2:
For sufficiency, assume that (
By (⊗7) and ( 8), we know that the result holds. Thus we can safely assume that both (
where r and r 1 is the rank over K and K ⊗ F 1 , respectively.
By P
By the minimality of β, r(¬(∧F 1 )∨A 1 ) ≥ β. Therefore we have γ ≤ β.
We are now ready to prove that 
To prove that K⊗(
It follows that there exists a finite subsetF 2 of F 2 such that ¬(∧F 2 ) ∈ K ⊗ F 1 and
By the assumed special construction of minimal change (α = 0), we have r
In the case of r(A ∨ B) < P
By the same argument above, we conclude that
Proof of Proposition 1:
Assume that A ∈ P ≤α and A ∈ Cn(F 1 ). Suppose that P ≤α ⊆ Cn(F 1 ). Then there exists B ∈ Cn(F 1 ) such that B ∈ P ≤α . Let
Proof of Theorem 3: Let
Then there exists a sentence A 0 ∈ K ⊗ F 1 such that F 2 ¬A 0 and r 1 (A 0 ) = γ. First we assume that F 2 ∪ K is inconsistent. Let P 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Assume that K ⊗ F 1 ⊆ P ≤α , a contradiction. Therefore we can safely assume that A ∈ K. Since F 1 ⊆ K, there exists B ∈ F 1 such that B ∈ K. Thus A ∈ K + {¬A ∨ ¬B} = K ⊗ {¬A ∨ ¬B}. However, it is not hard to verify that A ∈ (K ⊗ F 1 ) ⊗ F 1 {¬A ∨ ¬B}. This contradicts (⊗CB).
